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BRIEE
UNION_PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
LAW-R&ARTMENT

STEVEN A.^Sg«(felLNO.

406 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801)595-3226
Fax (801) 595-3265

General Solicitor

J. CLARE WILLIAMS
DENNIS C. FARLEY
LARRY A. GANTENBEIN

flLED

General Attorneys

March 25, 1992
Geoffrey J. Butler, Esq.
Clerk of the Court
UTAH SUPREME COURT
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
RE:

MAR 2 6 1992
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

Lewis Duncan/ et a h v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company/ et al.
Case No. 900233-Citation of Supplemental Authority

Dear Mr. Butler:
In accordance with Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, please find enclosed an original and nine copies of
the case of Robert E. Hatfield v. Burlington Northern Railroad
Company decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 6,
1992.
The decision/ which is to be published, reverses the
decision of the Federal District Court of Kansas decided in 1991,
found at 757 F. Supp. 1198, cited and relied upon by appellants
in their supplemental submission to the Court dated May 23, 1991.
Since the decision is to be published, I though it appropriate to
provide copies now rather than wait for the published citation,
particularly in view of the fact that briefing and oral argument
in this case were completed some time ago. I apologize for the
poorly copied first page which was in that condition when I
received it.
The case is being brought to the Court's attention for
the reasons that it is a decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals directly in point on the issue of public agency preemption of the railroad's common law duty to install warning devices
at public railroad crossings. The case is in point with the
arguments set forth under Point I. of Union Pacific's Brief on
Appeal.

JCW/rr
Enclosures
cc: Allan L. Larson, Esq.
Craig L. Barlow, Esq.
Anne Swensen, Esq.
Stephen J. Sorensen, Esq.
Michael A. Katz, Esq.
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PUBLISH
UHXTSD STATES COURT OF APPEALS

WAR 0 61992

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT LHOECKER
Clerk

ROBERT B. HATPI8LD,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 91-3158

v.
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD
COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
For the District of xonsae
D,C. No. 8&-1529-K
Phillip R. Fields, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant.
Timothy J. Xing (Terry 8. Stephens, with hi» on the briefs) of
Stinson, Laasweli f Wilson, Wichita, Kansas, for PlaintiffAppellee.
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JCOORB,

and

MOORB,

Circuit

Judges,

and

AL&BY,

District

Circuit Judge.

•The Honorable Wayne B. Alley, United States District Court Judge
for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
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intent

in FRSA % 434 to preempt the subject of adequate crossing

warnings once the Secretary of Transportation has acted upon
subject/

but found

no such

Burlington'B argument that
adopting

action

had occurred.

the Secretary

took that

this

Despite
action by

the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices on Streets

and Highways (MUTCD), the court

held

that

preemption

does not

oocur until a formal determination is made under the KUTCD of the
exact type of warning device to be installed
Following

the district

court's

at the crossing.

certification

under

28 U.S.C.

S 1292(b) i this appeal was taken.
We apply a de novo standard
decision

of review when

considering a

on summary judgment, Barnaon v. United States. 816 P.2d

549/ 552 (10th Cir.), cert, don lad. 484 F.2d 896 (1987),
use

the sane standard applied in the district court.

and we
Osgood v.

State Farm «ut. Auto Ins. Co.. 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988).

If

no genuine issue of material fact exists, we determine if the

'Section 434 states in partt
The
Congress
declares
that
laws,
rulesf
regulations, orders, and standards relating to railroad
safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent
practicable. A State nav adopt or continue In force anv
law, rule, regulation, order, or utandard relating to
railroad tafetv until such time a« the Secretary fof
Transportation) has adopted a rule, regulation, order.
or standard covering the •ublact matter of much State

requirement. A State may adopt or continue in f o r c e a n
additional or more stringent law, rale, regulation,
order, or standard relating to railroad safety when
necessary to eliminate or re duo e an essentially local
safety hasard, and when not incompatible with any
Federal law, rule, regulation, order, or standard, and
when not creating an undue burden on interstate
commerce•
45 U.8.C. $ 434 (emphasis added).
-3-

substantive law was correctly applied.
Tr«.

v.

Plrat

Cir. 1990).

Affiliated

Sec,

Applied

Genetics

Int'l.

Inc., 912 P.2d 1238, 1241 <10th

Because there are no disputed facts, the issue before

us is ripe for summary determination.

II.
in

1970«

with

the

adoption of FRSA, Congress required the

Secretary of Transportation to
problems

associated

S 433(a) (1976).
grade

crossing

Act,

safety

23

railroad

and

develop

grade

solutions

crossings.

FRSA also directs the Secretary to

traffic and safety.
Safety

with

study

problem

45 U.3.C.

address

Under the Highway

*£ 401-404 (1982), the Secretary has the

responsibility to develop uniform standards and to approve
designed

highway

receipt by the
Federal

state-

safety programs as a condition precedent to the

state

Highway

the

under his authority over highway

45 U.S.C, § 433(b) (1976).

U.S.C

to

of

federal

highway

funds.

the

Secretary

Administration,

Through

the

prescribed

procedures to obtain uniformity in highway traffic control devices
and adopted the HUTCD.
With

23 C.F.R. $ 655.601 (1981). 3

this background, we begin our analysis by agreeing with

the district court that S 434 of FRSA states an express preemption
of

state

lew. We also agree preeaption does not occur until the

Secretary adopts a rule,
subject

regulation,

or

standard

covering

the

matter of the state law. Thus, we must determine whether

any of the standards adopted by the Secretary

cover

the

subject

''Kansas has specifically adopted
the
MUTCD
standards
at
Kan, Stat. Ann. $ 8-2003 and Kan. Adoin. Regs. 82-7-4(c) (1989).
4-

matter

of the duty to install active warning devices at railroad
4
crossings (rhere unusually dangerous conditions exist»

III,
While this court has not addressed
arisen

in other

courte

with

mixed

the question,

results.

it has

In Marshall v.

Arlington Worthern. Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1983),
the oourt saids
The (XUTCDJ prescribes that the selection of devices at
grade crossing and the approval for federal funds is to
be nade by local agencies with jurisdiction over the
crossing. Thus, the Secretary has delegated federal
authority to regulate grade crossings to local agencies.
The locality in charge of the crossing in question.
has nade no determination under the manual regarding the
type of warning device to be Installed at the crossing.
Until a federal decision is reached through the local
agency on the adequacy of the warning devices at the
crossing, the railroad's duty under applicable state law
to maintain a "good and safe* crossing . . . is not
preempted.
Following Marshall, in Kixon v. Burlinoton
CV 8S-384-BLG-JF8,
court

found

litigation,

1988 VL 215409

preemption
the State

because,

a.ft..NO.

(D, Kont. Xay 2, 1988), the

prior

of Montana

Korthftfn

made

to the

incident

in

an agreement with the

^Courts have found the Secretary has acted upon other safety
subjects. fiftf, e.g,, aurlinoton Northrn R . B . C O . v. S t a f gj
M2fi£j.« 880 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1989) (cabooses)> Burlino±on
northern n.R. Cof v. State of Minn.. 882 ?.2d 1349 (8th Cir. 1989)
(cabooses); Slak v. National R.R. P a w n e e * Corp.. J&A1—T-^SapAi
llJ1
CST g naa
fe v

g f f r ^ t f o * 'Hffl

f_E—" * ££>'

*«

--

- - ******

Ptlla. coiam'n o* OhlgT 901 F.2d 49? (6th Cir. 1990) (hesardous
oateriala), cert, denied, H I 8* Ct. 781 (199i)| Morfolk a w..*»m
Rv. Co. v. Fubllo Utile. Conw'n of Qhift- 926 7.2d 567 (6th Cir.
1991) (waUcwavsW but see SoutherlT Pee. Trannn. Co. v. Pnh^ fl
U t l l i . coasY'ii of Cal.. 820 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 198?) (traoX
Clearance f and walkways\»
Pae. B.tt. v. ttallroad Common of
254 ( 5 t h c i r Missouri
1988

5^',552 :22*

-

> <oa*oo«««)f ****- denied, 48$

U.S. 1009 (1989).
-5-

railroad to install flashing lijht signals with autonatic gates at
the

crossing whore the incident occurred*

in Smith v. Norfolk t

flea ternfty.Co.. 776 P. Supp. 1335 (H.D. Ind. 1991),
applied

forghall

and granted

partial

prior to plaintiff's accident, the local
necessary

safety

devices

project was complete.

ficjL* 771 P. Supp.

made

aunwary judgment because
agency

determined tho

at the crossing and certified that the

In yderapn v. Chicago Cent. ft Pee. tt.q.

227 (H.O. 111. 1991),

railroad failed to present evidence that
Commission

the court

the court found the

the Illinois

Commerce

any determination under the MUTCD on the type of

warning device to be installed at the crossing where the collision
occurred.
In Basterwood v. CSX Tranae., Inc.. 933 P.2d 1548 (11th Cir.
1991), the court held preemption did not occur

where

a state,

because of financial constraints, failed to implement a decision
to install a particular signal device. Finally, in Southern Pag.
Transp. Co. v. Ma a a Trucking Co.. 758 P. Supp. 608 (P. Nev, 1991),

although citing Marshall, the court found no preemption where the
Nevada Public Service Commission had issued a report recommending
the crossing be upgraded with flashing lights and automatic gates,
but, at the time of the accident, the improvements had not been
made because the railroad claimed it had not received

federal

funds.

IV.
The dilemma presented by these varied results must be solved
by resort to the language

in the regulations
-6-

adopted by the

Secretary.

First,

all

traffic

control

devices

proposed

railroad crossings must comply with the uniform federal
expressed

highway

funding.

receive

23 C.F.R. S 655.603(b)(1). Third, the

standards are "intended for use both

HUTCD

standards

23 C . F . R . $ 646.214(b)(1).5 second, all

in the KUTCO.

states must adopt the KUTCO and its revisions in order to
federal

for

in

new

installations

and at locations where general replacement of present apparatus is
made,"

KUTCO, 1 0A-2.

Fourth, the MDTCD specifically states«
With due regard for safety and fox the integrity of
operations by highway and railroad users, the highway
agency and the railroad company are entitled to jointly
occupy the right-of-way in the conduct of their assigned
duties.
This requires joint responsibility in the
traffic control function between the public agency and
the railroad. The determination of need and selection
of devices at a grade crossing is made by the public
agency with jurisdictional authority. Subject to such
determination and selection, the design, installation
and operation shall be in accordance with the national
Standards contained herein.
KUTCO,

Part

vm,

% 8A-1.

Important for two reasons.
determine

what

This

provision

"devices" shall be ereoted at a grade crossing to
Two,

it

also

the "installation and operation" of such devices subject to

the determination of that agency*
need

partioulsrly

One, it circumscribes the authority to

"the public agency with jurisdictional authority.*
makes

is

is

made,

no

new

Thus, until a determination

of

device can be Installed or operated at a

crossing.
This provision relates to "grade crossing improvements' and
statest "All traffic control devices proposed shall conply with
the
latest edition of the Manual on Unffoxm Traffic Control
D v CS8
* f 4 .. f o F Streets and Highways supplemented to the extent
applicable by State standards."
-7-

V.
Tha operation of 11 8A-1 and 2 results in a consequence which
concerned

tha district court.

Assuming preemption occurred whan

the MUTCD was adopted or when the Secretary promulgated 23
$ 646.200,

the court

reasoned that a significant delay could be

encountered before a safety device would be installed*
believed

this

court

found

"no

regulation
would

I£b. at

at

gaps

1205*

in safety

Moreover, the

promulgated

by

the

prohibit a railroad from voluntarily

deciding to put in place an improved
gap period."

to avoid

757 T, Supp.

Hatfield.

Secretary . . . which

the

Tha court

"gap period" is inconsistent with "the recognized

view that 'S 434 manifests an intent
regulations•'"

C.F.R.

warning

device . . . during

1206. Thus, tha court reasoned, the

railroad has the authority (and assunably the duty) to install an
improved

warning

period*"

We disagree.

The

district

device

court's

at a dangerous crossing during the "gap

conclusion

overlooks

the

specific

language of XUTCD 1 80-1 which states i
The selection of traffic control devices at a grade
crossing is determined by public
agencies
having
Jurisdictional
responsibility at specific locations
a

e

•

e

Due to tha large number of significant variables
which must be considered there is no single standard
system of active traffic control devices universally
applicable for grade crossings. Based on an engineering
and trafflo investigation, a determination is made
whether any active) traffic control system is required at
a crossing and, if so, what type is appropriate, pefora,

A A S K a s mfldifioi ojcadt s&aMiia trafUfi ca&zcl
Jtt lnPtaUfttiiflpprOYfli1ft EWUlged jrcjtf £h*
ASBOSX aiilOx* A oixan fitatix

-0

txtiaa

appropriate

(emphasis

added).

This

regulation

effectively

railroad from acting on ite ovm to select

prohibits a

and install

device, contrary to the district court's conclusion.
absolves the railroad of any Independent

duty

a safety

Moreover, it

regarding

grade

crossing safety devices.

VI.
^he

scheme

of regulation is patent.

intent to invade the field
postponing

that

invasion

of grade
only

Congress expressed an

crossing
until

safety devices,

the

Secretary

of

Transportation adopted a rule, regulation, order, requirement, or
standard

relating

to that field.

The Secretary has responded by

adopting the MUTCD and making it applicable
Recognising

to grade crossings.

the variability of conditions that can arise at each

intersection, the Secretary has delegated to local
responsibility

authority the

of assessing the needs end establishing the design

for safety devices. Nonetheless, the statutory

aandate

for the

adoption of a standard that would supplement any state requirement
for grade crossing safety devices Is satisfied by the adoption of
the MUTCD.
Our

To that extent then, we disagree with MoXfiJlAll.

disagreement

with Marshall

goes

beyond our differing

analysis of language in PR6A and MUTCD pertaining to preemption of
common

law standards

of care

for grade

crossings, however.

1
—
"See also Kan. Stat. Ann. $ 8-1512 which statesi
a) No person shall place, maintain or display upon or
n view of any highway any unauthorised sign, signal,
narking or device which purports to be or is an
imitation of or resembles an official . . . railroad
sign or signal.

i

#•£•»

Continuing resort to common law standards

after

a

state

adopts

KUTCD disrupts a basic purpose of FRSA as it is implemented by the
provision of funding, namely,
contemplates

that

some

recognition

of

all

law

standards,

system.

Jury

mora

dangerous

verdicts

based

on

which Are of a high degree of abstraction

and generality, are ret respective-loo king
only

the

in accordance with a rational scheme based on surveys.

This is a prospective-looking
common

FRSA

sites are more dangerous than others and

that resources should first bo put to use on
ones,

priorities,

and

are

addressed

one crossing rather than a system of crossings*

miss common lav method runs

counter

to

a

to

The hit-or-

statutory

schema

of

planned prlorltisation.
Having

adopted

the

KUTCD,

the

Secretary

standard required by 45 O.S.C. S 434, and any state

prescribed
law

tha

relating

grade crossing safety devices was then superseded.

All $ 434

requires for preemption to occur is the adoption of the

standard,

to

and the KUTCD contains the standard.

Postponing the determination

of what specific device is required for a given grade crossing
simply a matter of implementing that standard.

is

The scheme enacted

by Congress did not anticipate that the effeot of the standard was
to

be

deferred

crossing

in

Secretary

the

adopted

or

made

United
the

selectively
States.

To

standard,

its

applicable for each grade
the

contrary,

once

the

superseding effect became

uniform throughout the nation*
He do not believe leaving responsibility
of

the

standard

to

local

authority

for

diminishes

implementation
this

result.

Requiring a local survey of grade crossing* to determine need
•10-

and

design

la

no wore than a pragmatic response to the multitude of

conditions that exist throughout the country which dictate whether
and

what

kind

of

a de/ice

is

required

Nonetheless, with the adoption of the

MOTCD,

at a specific place.
the

Secretary

has

absolved railroads from complying with duties imposed by state law
regarding safety devices at
duty,

a

railroad

cannot

grade

crossings.

Without

such

a

be liable in common law negligence for

failure to provide adequate safety devices at a grade crossing.
The judgment of the dlstrlot court is RXVBRSBD
with

and

RKMAHDBD

instructions to grant defendant's motion for summary partial

judgment and for

further

proceedings

on plaintiff's

remaining

claims*

-11-

•••END***

